The Horn of Africa, a region already scarred by decades of war, famine, and fractured alliances, is once again teetering on the edge of conflict. The uneasy peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea—once celebrated as a triumph of regional reconciliation—has rapidly deteriorated into a dangerous standoff. Ethiopia’s growing assertiveness over access to the Red Sea, combined with Eritrea’s hardened posture and cross-border meddling, has plunged the region into a vortex of suspicion, military build-up, and political intrigue.
At the heart of the crisis is Ethiopia’s quest for a seaport—an existential issue for Africa’s most populous landlocked country. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s public proclamations, coupled with quiet military mobilizations near the Eritrean border, have rung alarm bells in Asmara. Meanwhile, President Isaias Afwerki, ever the regional tactician, is not taking these signals lightly. Diplomatic circles in Nairobi, Riyadh, Ankara, and even Beijing are now nervously watching the chessboard shift, as the threat of another full-blown war in the Horn looms large.
But this is no ordinary bilateral dispute. The drama unfolding between Addis Ababa and Asmara entangles a web of alliances, proxy actors, and unresolved internal rifts—from the post-war tug-of-war in Tigray to the power plays in Sudan. The future of the Horn of Africa may well hinge on how this crisis is handled in the coming weeks.
A Seesaw Relationship: Brotherhood, Betrayal, and Bloodshed
The relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea has long been defined by turbulent shifts—close cooperation followed by bitter enmity. When the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and Ethiopia’s Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) joined forces in the 1990s to topple the Derg regime, many dreamed of a new, united era. Instead, Eritrea gained independence in 1993, and tensions escalated into a deadly border war from 1998 to 2000 that cost tens of thousands of lives.
The stalemate endured for nearly two decades until Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018. One of his early triumphs was a Saudi-brokered peace accord with President Isaias. Yet this peace, rooted more in mutual hostility toward the TPLF than genuine reconciliation, was always fragile.
When war erupted in Tigray in 2020, Eritrea joined forces with the Ethiopian government to crush their common enemy. But with the 2022 Pretoria Agreement sidelining Eritrea and granting unexpected concessions to the TPLF, cracks began to widen. Isaias, who had invested heavily in the conflict, was enraged by the outcome. His frustration only deepened as Abiy turned on his former allies in the Amhara region—another faction propped up during the war—and dismantled the very militias that had done the federal army’s heavy lifting.
What followed was inevitable: accusations of Eritrean meddling in Amhara’s insurgency, Ethiopian support for anti-Isaias exiles, and a steady drumbeat of mutual suspicion.
Ethiopia’s Red Sea Ambitions: A Flashpoint in Waiting
At the center of this spiraling crisis is Ethiopia’s bold—and some say reckless—push to reclaim access to the sea. Since losing its coastline in 1993, Ethiopia has been forced to rely on Djibouti and, more recently, Somaliland and Kenya for its trade routes. But the cost is high, and the geopolitical leverage even higher.
Prime Minister Abiy has made no secret of his intentions. In speeches that stir nationalist fervor, he has called Ethiopia’s lack of port access a “historical injustice.” The clear implication? Reclaiming that access, even by force if necessary.
The port of Assab, just 70 kilometers from the Ethiopian border, has become the focal point. Once Ethiopia’s primary maritime gateway, it’s now seen by many in Addis Ababa as a rightful prize. But for Eritrea, the notion of ceding control—or even negotiating over Assab—is tantamount to national suicide.
Despite Abiy’s denials, troop movements in the Afar region and military posturing suggest preparations for a potential strike. Asmara, for its part, is reportedly on high alert, fearing the worst.
Could this really escalate into war? In a region where historical grievances, strategic chokepoints, and personal rivalries mix like gunpowder, the answer is yes.
Tug-of-War in Tigray: The Forgotten Fuse
While the world watches the Red Sea rhetoric, Tigray quietly simmers with its own unresolved crisis. The Pretoria Agreement ended open hostilities but birthed a new political conflict: a power struggle between Debretsion Gebremichael’s traditionalist TPLF faction and Getachew Reda’s federal-aligned administration.
Abiy, wary of Debretsion’s past opposition, has sought to install a more pliable leadership in Mekelle. Meanwhile, Debretsion’s camp accuses Getachew of being a puppet and betraying Tigrayan interests. This division has left Tigray in political limbo—and ripe for exploitation.
Enter Eritrea.
Asmara has reportedly engaged Debretsion’s faction, perhaps seeking to use Tigray as a strategic buffer or bargaining chip. If true, this maneuver would significantly complicate any Ethiopian military campaign toward Assab. A reopened Tigrayan front—this time with Eritrean backing—would be a nightmare scenario for Abiy’s government.
With Getachew now ousted and Debretsion’s allies consolidating power in key towns, Tigray’s internal dynamics could soon have international consequences.
Proxy Wars and Shifting Alliances
This isn’t just a two-player game. The Horn’s great power rivalries are now entangled in this showdown. Ethiopia is closely allied with the UAE, which has provided both financial and military support. Eritrea, meanwhile, has warmed to Saudi Arabia and Egypt—both of which have reasons to undermine Ethiopia’s regional ambitions.
These alignments are playing out in Sudan’s civil war, where the UAE and Ethiopia back the RSF, while Eritrea supports militias aligned with the Sudanese army—alongside Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The proxy competition is intensifying, with Sudan becoming a geopolitical battleground that mirrors the larger Ethiopia-Eritrea fault line.
And with Turkey, China, and the United States each holding strategic interests in the region, the Horn of Africa now stands at the intersection of global rivalries and local animosities.
Diplomacy or Disaster: What Can Be Done?
Time is running out. The military build-ups, media propaganda, and covert alliances are all fueling a climate where a single miscalculation could unleash war. But diplomacy still has a fighting chance.
Mediators from China, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Kenya—all with varying degrees of influence—must act urgently to bring Abiy and Isaias back to the table. Any credible process must:
- Secure a non-aggression pledge from both sides, particularly regarding Assab.
- Establish back-channel diplomacy to prevent escalation and misunderstandings.
- Prohibit cross-border interference, including Eritrea’s support for insurgents and Ethiopia’s hosting of opposition groups.
- Discuss long-term solutions for Ethiopia’s port dilemma—whether through Somaliland, Djibouti, or new maritime corridors.
Pretoria’s deal may have stopped one war, but it left the seeds of another. The AU and Pretoria Agreement guarantors (South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria) must re-engage, particularly to stabilize Tigray and guide it back into Ethiopia’s political structure.
Conclusion: A Region at the Crossroads
The Horn of Africa has endured too much bloodshed to sleepwalk into another war. Yet that’s exactly what may happen if regional leaders and international stakeholders do not act decisively.
Ethiopia’s legitimate grievances about sea access must be addressed—but not through gunfire. Eritrea’s sovereignty must be respected—but not at the cost of regional peace. Tigray’s internal turmoil must be resolved—but not manipulated as a pawn in broader conflict.
As Addis Ababa and Asmara edge toward confrontation, the region must choose between fire and dialogue.
Is it too late to pull back from the brink? Or will the Horn once again become a theatre of war?
The world should be watching. And the region must start talking—before the window of peace slams shut.